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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Appellants were charged by information with the crimes of robbery and
rape in violation of Sections 76-51-1
and 76-53-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
as amended.

Upon pleas of not guilty a

jury trial was held and Appellants were
each found guilty of rape and robbery and

committed to the Utah State Prison for
ten years to life (R 69, 70).
1

Defendants-

Appellants now appeal from the verdicts
and judgments entered.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek reversal of the
convictions and judgments of the Lower
Court and ask that the cases be remanded
for a new trial.

-2-

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Case Nos.
) 9986 and
vs.
) 9987
)
JESSE BAUTISTA and
)
JOHN FRANCIS BAUTISTA,
)

Defendants-Appellants.l

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
These are appeals from convictions
of rape and robbery and sentences to the

Utah State prison on each count for each
Defendant.

The case was tried to a jury

with the Honorable John F. Wahlquist
presiding.
-1-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The prosecutrix is a 19-year old
Weber College student (R 114).

She tes-

tified that on the night of February 10,

1972, she attended an exchange party between her sorority and a fraternity held
at the bowling alley in the Studen Union
Building.

She left the social at 11 p.m.,

in her Peugeot Sports car and drove South
along Harrison Boulevard, turning off on a
side road near the Wilshire Theatre.

She

stated the occupants of an old, big white
car behind her began honking its horn as
if they wanted to talk to her.

119)

(R 118,

They drove alongside as if to pass.

She stated she pulled her car over,
1

and that Appellants got out of the
-3-

white automobile and came over to her
small foreign car.

Her reason for stop-

ping is not clear from the record as she
stated "Well, I can't remember the
thoughts that were in my mind at that
time" in response to the prosecutor's
attempt to lead her into saying she was
forced off the road.

(R 120)

Under

cross-examination, she stated the other
auto merely pulled up along side her and
did not pull in front of her.

149, 152)

(R 148,

She stated one Appellant got

into her car from the driver's side and
the other from the passenger's side.
"They had a gun and told me to get in the

middle," she stated, (R 120).

No weapon

was produced at the trial and the prose-4-

cutrix described it as follows:
1

"It seems

like it was white on yellow or something,
I don't know"

(R 122).

She stated the

men drove her car to a point near the
Seven-Eleven store on Washington Boulevard and parked it.
The occupants were joined by a
third man, who had followed them in the
white car.

At this juncture, prosecutrix

got into the white car and a white hat
was allegedly placed over her head so as
to obstruct her vision.

(R 123)

As the four drove around in the white
car, one of the men seated next to her is
said to have asked if she had any money in
her purse.

She said she told him that he

could have her money - that "he could have
-5-

anything, but please just let me go and
don't hurt me".

(R 124, 125)

Subsequently, they stopped to buy
gas for the car, and later they stopped
again to buy some beer.

(R 125, 126)

At no time did she attempt to sound an
alarm or make an escape.

(R 173-74)

They continued driving for twenty or thirty
minutes and the men began drinking some of
the beer.

Prosecutr ix told them "they

shouldn't drink it while he was driving;
(R 127) and they then turned off onto a

dirt road and drove for another ten or
fifteen minutes.

The prosecutrix had no

idea of where they were.

(R 129)

She testified that after the automobile was parked one Appellant began
-6-

1

unzipping her coat, she stated, "and he
kind of hit me" (R 130) 'on the face or

chest or somewhere," removed her lower
articles of clothing (Rl31) and had intercourse with her.

(R 132)

She later

remembered that she had removed at least
some of her own clothing.

(R 167)

The

driver then sat in the back seat with
her, tried to kiss her, but did not have
intercourse with her at that time.
(R 132)

The second Appellant allegedly

then had intercourse with her, and was
followed by the driver who also had intercourse with her.

The prosecutrix

testified that the three then drove
back to her car in Ogden.

her

She testified

about running a police "road block" on

-7-

the way back (R 135) and that when they
returned to where her auto was parked,
two police cars pulled up along side and
checked the driver's license and took
him to their car when he couldn't produce
one.

(R 137)

After the police left, the

prosecutrix claims the Appellants returned
her to her auto, gave her a dollar and
offered to follow her home.

(R 137)

South Ogden police officers confirmed
that they had stopped a white 1960 Dodge
at 2:40 a.m. of the day in question and
identified one Appellant as being an occupant.

Officer Darrell Jones testified that

he observed a female in the back seat and
a male and they appeared to be embraced
most of the time.

(R 204)
-8-

He said he

figured it was a boy friend-girl friend
relationship.

(R 206) Another South

Ogden Police Officer, Louis J. Passey,
remembered seeing a couple in the back
seat.

He noted that "one was maybe a

girl friend-boy friend there and it
looked like embracing in that fashion."
He did not recall seeing anyone wearing
a hat.

(R 209)
The prosecutrix testified she

arrived home between 3 and 4 a.m., and
was met by her mother and
"as I walked in the door she
came. She watched me come in.
She was waiting for me. She
heard me come home, the lights
were on."
The prosecutrix testified further,
"I walked into the house and
-9-

I said something terrible
had happened to me, but I
can't tell you because I
promised." (R 176)
Her mother then advised her she
had already called the police and the
hospitals.

Prosecutrix then went to the

bathroom without further conversation.
(R 177)

Her mother then called the hos-

pital and advised prosecutrix they were
going to the hospital.
not ask to go.

Prosecutrix did

As they prepared to leave,

a police car drove into the driveway and
the officer indicated he wanted to ask
her some questions.

(R 178)

Prosecutrix

left for the hospital with her mother
without saying anything to the police.
At the hospital, a police sergeant again
tried to ask her questions but she declined
-10-

to answer.

Later, she was examined by

a doctor and after the examination her
Bishop arrived.

She was then taken

into another room and in the presence
of her mother, the police, the doctor
and her Bishop she "answered quest ions."
(R 179, 180)

Dr. William R. Egnert testified
that he examined the prosecutrix on the
morning in question and confirmed that
i
'

I

I

the prosecuting witness had sperm in
her vagina and a laceration of the

l He further

hymen one centimeter in length.

(R 184)

testified that he found no

I
i bruises (R 185) or evidence of her hav-

I

ing been recently struck on the upper
part of her body, (R 18 8) and that she
-11-

remained silent during the course of his
examination.

(R 187)

He stated that

prior to the examination he had been told
prosecutrix "was not willing to say anything about what happened" (R 186) but
that he had been told she had allegedly
been "raped" and had been asked to check
her to see what he could find.

(R 187)

Appellant Jesse Bautista testified
that he, his brother and a third man had
encountered the prosecutrix Southbound
on Washington Boulevard in her auto stopped

at a red light.

He stated they pulled along

side her auto and his brother hollered and
whistled and that she waved back.

Prose-

cutrix then turned into a lot and then drove
back on the street and headed North.

-12-

Appellant stated they turned and followed
her and that after a block and a half she
pulled over and they stopped behind her.
(R 225, 226)

He then stated his brother,

Johnny Bautista, got out and walked up
to her auto and that after a few minutes
of conversation prosecutrix got out of
(

I

her auto and joined them in theirs.
Appellant further stated that as

I

\

they drove they decided to get some beer
and that prosecutrix volunteered to pay
at least a portion of the cost of a sixpack.

(R 227).

He stated that prose-

cutrix opposed their drinking while driving and suggested "we just go off and

drink some place where you don't have to
drive and drink and hit somebody."
-13-

(R 228)

They then went to a service station to
get some gas and use the washroom (R 229)
and then drove in a Westerly direction

for about 20 or 30 minutes and stopped.
Appellant stated that he and the third
man left the auto with prosecutrix and

Johnny Bautista seated in the back seat.
When he returned Johnny approached him
'

bragging how he talked her into it."

1

(R 231)

Appellant stated that he and the

driver each tried to seduce her but that
she resisted him saying she was "sore
down there."

He stated that he at no time

had sexual relations with her. (R 232,
233)

He denied the presence or exhibition

of any gun (R 334 and denied that any hat
was ever placed over her eyes. (R 237)
-14-

Under cross-examination Appellant
Jesse Bautista further stated that he
was a student at Weber State College
until the time of his arrest, that he
was married but separated from his wife
(R 238) and that he repairs automobiles
for a living.
Appellant John Bautista also testified.

His statements corroborated the

account given by his brother (R 264-274).

He acknowledged that he had intercourse
with the prosecutrix but denied that any
force was exerted.

(R 271, 272)

-15-

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPLAYING
A CO-DEFENDANT NOT ON TRIAL, TO THE JURY
•WHILE CHAINED, HANDCUFFED, UNSHAVEN, UNGROOMED AND DRESSED IN COMMON JAIL ATTIRE,
AFTER DEFENDANTS RAISED THE DEFENSE OF
CONSENT TO RAPE AND ROBBERY CHARGES.
POINT II
·
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
( GRANT A MISTRIAL BASED ON THE PROSECUTOR'S
l(DERISIVE STATEMENTS CONCERNING DEFENDANTS'
RACIAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
I TO EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JURORS FOR CAUSE.
I

POINT IV
THAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE
, FOREGOING ASSIGNED ERRORS DEPRIVED THE APPELLANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL.

I

-16-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPLAYING
A CO-DEFENDANT NOT ON TRIAL, TO THE JURY
1mILE CHAINED, HANDCUFFED, UNSHAVEN, UNGROOMED Ai\TD DRESSED IN COMMON JAIL ATTIRE,
AFTER DEFENDANTS RAISED THE DEFENSE OF CONSENT TO RAPE AND ROBBERY CHARGES.
Defendants-Appellants were charged
with rape and robbery.

Both testified rais-

ing the defense of consent and considerable
evidence of consent was before the Court.

A

third man had also been charged, was awaiting a separate trial, and was languishing
in jail.

In the middle of the defense case

the trial Judge abruptly interruped the
testimony and summoned counsel to the bench
to advise them that the third Defendant had
been brought into Court.

-17-

(R254)

The Judge later acknowledged that the
third Defendant had been introduced to
the Courtroom while trial was in progress
"in order to avoid delay" and to "have
him somewhere available if he is wanted."
When asked by defense counsel if the
prosecutor had requested that he be
brought in, the Judge rep 1 ied "I did this
myself."

(R 283)

Upon timely objection from defense
counsel, the Judge stated for the record:
"The record may show that Batchelor
has been brought down, and that he is in
jail clothes and the defense makes a motion to redress him before they put him
in the Courtroom. The Court denies this.
I believe the jury understands that he is
in jail, and he has got jail clothes on,
and he has been brought in in irons and
is handcuffed." (R 254)
The Court casually observed that the
-18-

Co-Defendant "looked like an ordinary prisoner" (R 285) and allowed him to be identified as the driver of the vehicle in

' which Defendants and prosecutrix had previously testified they were riding (R 29091).

The Co-Defendant described the

occurrence and his physical conditions at
a hearing outside the jury (R 287-88) as

follows:

Q.

Were you at that time in your

regular jail attire, jail clothes?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Were you given an opportunity

to put on your street clothes?
A.

No, sir; I was not.

Q.

Were you advised as to where

you were to be taken?

-19-

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Were you brought from the jail

into the Courtroom directly?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you have an opportunity to

consult with your legal counsel before
you were brought here?

A.

No, sir, I did not.

Q.

Did you have an opportunity to

shave prior to corning here?

1

A.

No, sir.

Q.

When was the last time you

shaved?

A.

Yesterday.

Q.

Were you given an opportunity

to comb your hair?
A.

No, sir.

-20-

Q.

When was the last time you

, combed your hair?

A.

Yesterday.

Objections to the Co-Defendant being in the Courtroom for identification
in his condition were timely and pro-

perly registered by the defense, (R 254
and 290) renewed in a motion for a mis-

trial.

(R 282)

These appeals present an issue
\ of first impression before this Court.

: Defendants contest the propriety of
the trial Judge's unilateral disruption

I
1

I
1

I

of a tr ia 1 to bring a Co-Defendant not then on trial - from the jail to

J

be paraded in front of the jury "for

I

identification purposes" while dressed

I

)

-21-

in common jail attire, in handcuffs and
leg irons, and while unshaven, ungroomed,
and uninformed as to where and for what
purpose he was to be taken and used.

To

so exhibit a Defendant to a jury would
clearly be prejudical error.

The Idaho

Supreme Court has properly observed that
a Defendant's right to make a presentable

appearance is intricately related to the
fairness and openess of the trial he receives.

State v. Carver 94 Idaho 677,

496 P2d 676 (1972).

State

See also Alexander v.

Okla. Crim.

~~~

493 P2d 458

~~~-

(1972); Garcia v. Beto 452 F2d 655 (5th
Cir. 1971) Ephriam v. State
Crim. App.

Tex.

471 S.W. 2d 798 (1971).

In light of the particular sensitivity
-22-

of appearance in this case and by a
parity of reasoning, a compelling argument is made that a Co-Defendant not on trial - must be properly attired
before being injected into the trial of
others charged with personal association
and with the same criminal acts.

The

point could nowhere be more compelling
than in the trial of a rape case where
consent is the basis of the defense.
Clearly, if a man who allegedly was
their associate makes a slovenly appearance the defense of consent is vitiated and Defendants were prejudicated.
The trial Court's refusal to grant Defendants timely request that Co-Defendant be made presentable prior to further

-23-

contact with the jury deprived the Defendant a fair trial.

Furthermore, the Court's

action could accomplish nothing more than
instillation in the jurors' minds
here was a worthless lot".

'~hat

See State v.

Martinez 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P2d 102.

The

trial Judge's assertion that the Co-Defendant was introduced to the jury as he was
"in order to avoid delay"(R 283) is not
persuasive.

No one had asked for him.

Neither counsel intended to call him and
both were aware that he was incarcerated
in the same building and available to them
in a matter of minutes if they asked for
him.
Although the jail clothing, unkempt
appearance, handcuffs and leg irons may
-24-

not influence adversely the thinking
of a seasoned trial Judge, it does not
follow that jurors are similarly calloused.

One need not dwell on the pro-

priety of the Court's motives in taking
the action complained of inasmuch as
the prejudicial effect on the jury can
and should be assumed.
The introduction of the Co-Defendant as described was an open invitation
for the jurors to speculate as to many
issues not before them.

Although he was

not called upon to answer questions, the
State was able to elicit prejudicial
testimony from him through his silence
and his appearance.
The jurors were encouraged to spe-

-25-

culate that the defense did not choose
to call the Co-Defendant for fear of what
he would say, or they could speculate
that he too was facing a separate trial and
would choose to say nothing which might
incriminate him.

It is error for a prose-

cution to call a Co-Defendant, knowing that
he will invoke his privilege against selfincr imination and it matters not that the
party calling the witness was the Judge.
See State v. Smith 446 P2d 571, 581 (1968).

The jurors could further speculate
that since Co-Defendant was not on trial
with Appellants that he had already been
convicted or more likely entered a plea
of guilty.

From his jail clothes, hand-

cuffs, leg irons and unkempt condition it

-26-

would be normal to speculate that such
was the case and that if he was guilty

the other Defendants were also guilty.
It is significant that it was the
Defendant's case which was interrupted
by the Judge's declaration that

Mr.

Batchelor was available in the Courtroom.

Hence, in effect the Judge called

the Co-Defendant as a witness.
appearance testified.

His

So did his silence.

Both were negative and adverse to Defendants.

The trial Judge's action could

only be indicative of a desire that the
jury view the Co-Defendant at his worst.

The jury in turn was left to speculate
as to why the Judge wanted them to view

the Co-Defendant.

They were forced to

-27-

give unwarranted attention to the Co-Defendant.

He was spotlighted to them in

a totally negative light.

They could

hardly overlook defense's surprise or
the hurried bench conferences filled with
whispered emotional conversations between
defense counsel and the Court.

(R 254)

This Court has repeatedly taken the
position that a trial Court should not on
its own motion invite the jury to question
witnesses.

State v. Anderson 108 Utah

130, 158 P2d 127, 128 29 (1945) State v.

Martinez 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P2d 102 103-04
(1957).

In the instant case, jurors were

not invited to question the witness but
they were clearly invited to speculate as
to why the Defense

did not question him.
-28-

He could have already been convicted
or have pled guilty or there might

have been differences between the men.
All add up to one thing, the trial
Court put Defendants in an unwarranted
dilemma.

We would be

naive to assume

that the jury would not interpret the

defense's decision not to call the witness as evidence of their guilt.
The issue becomes whether the

!jury in viewing the set of facts as de)

1~loped

could have arrived at adverse

conclusions influencing their verdict.
If so, the judgment should be reversed.
1

1

It is fundamental to a fair trial that
as

many opportunities for speculation

as

possible be removed from the trier

-29-

of fact.

This was clearly not done.

For

additional guidance this Court might turn
to U.S. Supreme Court's statement that
"prejudice is presumed from a material
error absent in affirmative showing to
the contrary."

Crawford v. United States

212 U.S. 183 (1909) Appellants' submit
that the conduct complained of is the
kind of material error to which the United
States Supreme Court referred.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT A MISTRIAL BASED ON THE PROSECUTOR'S
DERISIVE STATEMENTS CONCERNING DEFENDANTS'
RACIAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND.

The prosecutor argued his closing

-30-

position by painting a rosy picture
of the prosecutrix and an unsavory one
of the Appellants chastising them
socially and racially.

(R 323-35)

Next, you have to ask yourselves,
if Jill Bateman is going to engage in sex, illicit sex, why is
she going to choose these two
individuals right here? What is
there about these two people over
here that is so appealing? Jill
Bateman, a daughter of a dentist,
a daughter of a school teacher,
a student at Weber State College,
a dental technician by her own
testimony is a religious girl, a
virgin, why would she go out with
this caliber of individuals? She
belongs to a social sorority.
From such you can draw the implica ticn that she wants to meet similar situated people as her, people
with her background, people she
can empathize with, people that
she feels familiar with, perhaps
meet somebody that some day can
support her in the manner in which
she is accustomed to. Why would
she go out with a person not of
-31-

her own race, a person she never
knows, and a person that allegedly
flags her down on Washington Boulevard? . . . And anybody that would
do that is about as low an individual that you will ever come across.
Clearly, such comments disparaging
the Appellants and appealing to racial and
social bias is rank prosecutorial misconduct.

Such were not even tolerated in

Louisiana in 1915.

In State v. Washington

136 La 855, 67 So. 930 (1915) a conviction
of rape was reversed wherein the district
attorney referred to prosecutr ix as "a woman having white blood in her veins" and
saying "Gentlemen do you believe she would
have had intercourse with this black brute?"
In the instant case the defense asked
first for an opportunity to reply to the

-32-

inflammatory remarks at a bench conference immediately after the prosecutor
concluded his diatribe.

(R 326)

The

request was denied and the Judge gave
no precautionary instructions to the
jurors.

Minutes later and after the

jury had left the Courtroom to deliberate, the defense renewed the objection
in the form of a motion for a mistrial
which in part focused upon the prosecutor's remarks as being improper and
prejudicial.

(R 327)

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JURORS FOR CAUSE.
The jury voir dire was confusing
1

from the outset.

The Court got matters

started by telling the jury "Now the
-33-

fact that the two men are on trial is
merely a matter of convenience."

(R 78)

The Judge went on to say "What the State
is alleging, occurred.

They allege that

there was a female stuc'.ent at Weber State
College . . . they claim that she was
taken forcefully from the car and a weapon
was used to threaten her . . • they claim

she was taken to a secluded place and there
she was raped by three individuals

"

(R 78, 79)(Emphasis added)

The jurors added to the problem.

A

Mr. Dykes stated of Defendants "These two

fellows I have seen before.

When I worked

for Chambers Music when we were working
in the vending machine business, with juke

box machines or whatever on 25th Street
-34-

area. II

(R 83) (In fact Defendants were

new to the City but how do you impeach
a juror?)

A Mr. Cherry followed by responding to the Cotr t 's inquiry as to his
personal knowledge of the alleged of, fens es by saying "No, I have no knowledge of this Court case.

I have never

been acquainted with any rape or robbery charge.

I with

I have been acquainted

a murder charge."

(R 85)

(After

I

:the trial it was learned that Appeallants were being investigated in a
T.urder case for which Co-Defendant

. Batchelor was charged.)
I
During the course of the remainder
of the voir dire sever a 1 instances of
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juror bias were demonstrated.

A Mr. Dee

volunteered that he had very strong feelings against the crime of rape.

In explor-

ing his comment the conversation went as
follows:

Mr. Marsh:

Do you feel that the

aversion would have any undue influence
on you?

Mr. Dee:

Well, I like to think not.

I am trying to be honest.

As far as guilt

or innocence is concerned, like I say, l
don't think it would have much bearing,
but then again it might be subconscious.

Mr. Marsh:

You think the fact that

a person is charged with a crime is any
kind of indication of guilt or innocence
or would this arouse any feeling of animosity
-36-

in yourself?
Mr. Dee:

Well, I feel that, in due

process of law and everything if a person
is arrested and were identified by the
victim, I feel that there must be some
sort of significance to that.

Mr. Marsh:

You feel the fact that

the charge has been made and that the allegation has been made is in fact some
evidence to the guilt or innocence of the
parties charged?
:Mr. Dee:

Well, I feel they have

been involved, I don't know about guilt
or innocence.

(Emphasis added) (R 99)

At another point a Mrs. Wagstaff
indicated that because of her feelings
arising out of another rape charge she
-37 -

should not be involved in hearing this
matter.

When asked by the prosecutor "In

light of your feelings do you think your
verdict might be swayed even slightly in
the way that you would veiw this evidence
that would come out today?"

Mrs. Wagstaff

acknowledged that "It might."

The pro-

secutor in open Court asked that Mrs.
Wagstaff be struck for cause from the
panel.

(R 96)

The Court deferred judg-

ment and later defense counsel asked Mrs.
Wagstaff "You mean that you would not be
able to listen objectively to the evidence
as it is submitted to you and make an independent and objective determination as
to the gui 1 t or innocence of the accused?"
To which Mrs. Wagstaff replied:
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"I am too

upset."

The Court then inquired:

"You

realize that this is an entirely different
case?"

To which Mrs. Wagstaff replied:

"Yes, but"

(R 97, 98)

A Mr. Herrera also stated that

he v.nuld prefer not to sit on the case.
In the ensuing conversation the prosecutor asked

'~nd

is this a personal feel-

ing or is it because the Defendants are
of the same origin and background as you?"
Mr. Herrera then stated "One is for that

and the other one, I don't think I could
make a decision.

Sometimes I don't even

• •
II
ma k e my own d ecisions.

The prosecutor

then a·sked "Do you think that your feelings would affect the verdict?"
Mr. Herrera replied:

"Right."

-39-

To which
The pro-

secutor in open Court then moved that Mr.
Herrera be struck for cause.

(R 97)

Again

the Court deferred decision on the motion
to strike the juror.
After all questions had been asked
of the prospective jurors the prosecutor
renewed his motion to excuse Mrs. Wagstaff
and Mr. Herrera for cause and defense counsel
acquiesced.The trial Judge sunnnarily denied
both requests.

Defense counsel then chal-

lenged Mr. Dee for cause and after the Court's
refusal to discharge him defense counsel
challenged the entire panel of jurors.
(R 102, 103)
Clearly the right to a trial byjury
includes the right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury, and a trial by jury, one or
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more of whose members is biased or preju1

diced, is not a constitutional trial.
State v. Parnell, 77 Wash. 2d 503, 463
P.2d 134 (1969); Seattle v. Jackson, 70
Wash. 2d 733, 425 P.2d 385 (1967).

The

Kansas Supreme Court recently noted that
an "impartial juror" is one who is free
from bias.

State v.

Cole~an,

587, 481 P.2d 1008 (1971).

206 Kan.

These cases

are instructive in that they provide
some basic guidelines.

Here the question

presented in juror disqualification because
of bias in the context of a trial Court's
abrogation of the right to challenge a
propective juror for cause.

The Nevada

Supreme Court has ruled that a legislature
cannot abrogate the right to challenge
a juror for cause.

Frame v. Grisewood,

81 Nev. 114, 399 P.2d 450 (1965).

Should

a trial court be able to so do then?

Ap-

pellants submit that the question must be
answered in the negative.
The Appellants further assert that the
disqualification of the prospective juror
was evident and manifest as a matter of law.
The United States Supreme Court has stated
that "the bias of a prospective juror may be
actual or implied; that is, it may be bias
in fact or bias conclusively presumed as a
matter of law."

United States v. Wood,

299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936).

When a juror

candidly acknowledges that he has strong
feelings against rape, and goes on to say
that he feels that the fact that a party
is charged and identified is evidence of
involvement, surely fairness requires that

this venireman be excused for cause.
In the same vein

jurors

who admit

that because of personal reasons their
emotions might sway their verdict should
not be retained on a jury.

Each are

disqualified as a matter of law.
Surely it is error to force counsel
to needlessly expend valuable peremptory
challenges on veniremen who exhibit bias.

POINT V
THAT THE CUMUI.ATIVE EFFECT OF
THE FOREGOING ASSIGNED ERRORS DEPRIVED
THE APPELLANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL.
Appellants submit that each of
the foregoing errors assigned presents
adequate grounds upon which this Court
i

could reverse and order a new trial.
Should the Court find, however, that no
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single issue, by itself, necessitates
reversal, the Court is then urged to "scrutinize with care the propriety of all aspects of the proceedings."

State v. St.

Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955).
And in so doing:
(I)f there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such
errors a different verdict might
have been rendered, a new trial
should be granted. Id. at 244.
It has long been recognized by this
Court that there may be several errors in
a trial, and each error may not independently
be sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a
reversal, but when each is viewed in conjunction with the others, the cumulative
effect will amount to the denial of a fair
trial.

This position was established in
-44-

State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d
903 (1942), and the latter was reaffirmed
by this Court in State v. St. Clair,

supra, wherein it was said:
It is recognized that a combination
of errors which, when singly considered might be thought insufficient to warrant a reversal, might
in their cumulative effect do so.
Id. at 243.
Viewed from another perspective,
a judgment should be reversed on the ground
of judicial misconduct although any one
of several items of misconduct may not

justify reversal, where their cumulative
effect is such that in their absence a
different verdict would not be improbable.
Delzell v. Dav, 36 Cal. 2d 349, 223 P.2d
625 (1950) (Cal. Sup. Ct. in bank).
-45-

Indeed, a Federal Court recently
concluded that a person's right to a fair
trial can be violated even without a showing
of identifiable prejudice, if the totality
of the circumstances raises a probability
of prejudice.

Glenn v. State, 341 F. Supp.

1055 (D. Mo. 1972).

If the assigned errors

are not found to be prejudicial singly or
in the cumulative effect, this Court can
still find that the totality of the circumstances raises a probability of prejudice due to the emotional nature of a rape
case.
As previously noted, the inherently
emotional nature of prosecutions for rape
present unusual problems for Courts.

This

is illustrated in the fact that the essence
-46-

of rape has been said to be not the
fact of intercourse, but injury and
outrage to the feelings of a woman by
means of carnal knowledge effectuated by
force.

State v. McCune, 16 Utah

51 P. 818 (1898).

170,

The impossibility

of a defense in such a case must also be
considered.

See State v. Horne, 12 Utah

2d 162, 364 P.2d 109 (1961).

Appellants

submit that the emotion and difficulty
of defense which accompany rape prosecutions require a more strict scrutiny
of the entire record to ascertain whether
improprieties when considered as a whole
were prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
The individual and cumulative effect
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of the foregoing assigned errors is clearly
and uncontrovertably prejudicial, reversible
error.

The conduct of this trial falls

short of standards enunciated by this Court
and the United States Supreme Court and
necessitates a new trial.
Appellants therefore pray that the
judgments against each Defendant on each
charge be reversed and Appellants be discharged or in the alternative, that the
cases be reversed and remanded for

new

trials.
Respectfully Submitted,
WILLIAM D. MARSH
Attorney for DefendantsAppe llants
1018 First Security Bank
Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
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